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ICO as Mainstream Method of Capital Raising
Eduard Yelagin and Evgeny Radetskiy

Abstract
We develop a theory of financing entrepreneurial ventures by Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). We show
how distributed ledger technology (Blockchain) allows ventures to significantly decrease the price of
issuance of new types of securities relative to a traditional venture capital (VC) approach. In addition, we
discuss several types of new securities, called tokens. We explore the source of their value and benefits
(and negative qualities) for entrepreneurial ventures and investors. We find that, in general, different
types of tokens can provide unique benefits and additional information about a tokens’ issuer market
sentiment. The following information would become available with the help of ICO: Net income of the
company, demand for the particular good or service by an issuer of the token, and future growth rate of
the issuer as perceived by the market. Finally, we provide numerical examples showing exact
circumstances under which it would be beneficial for an entrepreneurial venture to issue tokens instead
of VC to raise an additional capital.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Birth of Bitcoin
The predecessors of today’s elaborated system of cryptocurrency market are technologies from
several fields of study: Monetary system philosophy, cryptography, and technology. The synergy of
these three branches of science is called “Cryptocurrency”, and, hence, the first practical application,
“Bitcoin”. Thus, in order to fully understand why Bitcoin was the progenitor of the whole new market,
it is important to consider what the pillars of Bitcoin are, and their respective roles.

1.2 Monetary System Philosophy pillar
The goals and ideas of first ever created cryptocurrency were published on October 31st, 2008
(Vigna and Casey, 2015). The theory states that the publish date of Bitcoin was confined to the time of
the global crisis (Chuen, Guo, and Wang, 2017). Moreover, it was the most uncertain time of the global
crisis, which could be approximated by the TED spread (see Table 1) 1. The essence of Bitcoin is
described in its “White Paper”2. The philosophy of this paper was to provide a new alternative to today’s
modern economic system which was similar to the chaos at the end of 2008 (Brito and Castillo, 2013).
The methodology created to realize this goal was by “chain of hash-based proof-of-work” which later
became known as “Blockchain”3. This system encompasses the following:




Secured transactions without trusted third party (also known as peer-to-peer transactions)
Certain level of anonymity of a transaction
Limited coin supply

1.3 Cryptography pillar
There were other alternatives of electronic payments prior to creation of Bitcoin. The very first
electronic money was developed with the boom of Internet and dot-com industry. This digital currency
was called DigiCash. Just like Bitcoin, DigiCash used cryptographic protocols to provide anonymity of
transactions for its users (Chaum, 1983). However, the general stability of external economy,
centralization of DigiCash, and maintenance costs of its platform, resulted in the lack of a client base
and, as a result, bankruptcy (Brodesser, 1999).
Later, other digital currencies startups, such as Tencent QQ and E-gold, emerged. Although they
used better technology than DigiCash (e.g., E-gold gained popularity and achieved spending of $2 billion
per year), they were still centralized, which gave the U.S. government some degree of influence.
Eventually, these types of financial services got a reputation for money laundering, frauds and
cybercrimes, and were shut down by the U.S. government (Cloherty, 2013).
1

TED Spread is calculated as the spread between 3-Month LIBOR based on US dollars and 3-Month Treasury Bill.
See https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TEDRATE
2
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
3
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
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Satoshi Nakomoto, the author or group of authors of Bitcoin’s “White Paper”, created a
decentralized version of such financial service. According to the Bitcoin blockchain system, each
transaction is registered as an irreversible block of information. Moreover, each block is attached to a
previous block, and so on until the very first block, called the “Genesis Block” (Bhaskar and Chuen,
2015). This system of blocks renders impossible the likelihood of intervention, because each block has
information about the previous block (unless it is the first or last one). Moreover, to create a new block
(a transaction, for Bitcoin’s blockchain), mining nodes (other users of this blockchain) have to verify that
the transaction is valid, and must add it to the newly-built block (Antonopoulos, 2014). 4 This system
allows users to complete a transaction without a third party or an intermediary and makes blockchain
highly resistant to cyber-attacks. In theory, there are two possible ways to attack blockchain: By
corrupting 51% of blockchain users, or by an extremely powerful computer which would be able to
create blocks and validate transactions as fast as possible. If first variant is highly improbable, the
second variant is a serious threat to Bitcoin blockchain. Thus, to minimize the second possibility, Bitcoin
blockchain was programmed to create only one block each 10 minutes (Croman and Eyal, 2016).

1.4 Technology Pillar
To restate the role and functionality of blockchain, it is an efficient platform for transactions,
where each user has equal power and equal level of trust. In theory, blockchain has very few drawbacks.
In practice, however, given a limited amount of processing power, blockchain technology has several
problems.
A. Transaction time.
An increased popularity of Bitcoin attracted a lot of new users to its blockchain system. Hence,
an increase in the number of transactions to be processed and the problem of scaling. As previously
stated, each block has a 10-minute size limit which creates a significant delay for transactions. Since
March 2018, Bitcoin tried to integrate the Lightning Network to increase the speed of transaction.
However, this created even more problems for the Bitcoin blockchain. Table 2 illustrates the average
transaction time in the Bitcoin blockchain network. It is evident, that during the busiest trading periods,
transaction time can reach more than three days.5
B. High transaction fees.
In order to motivate an inclination of mining nodes to process a transaction, a user can attach a
fee to that transaction, which would constitute a reward for the node.6 With a growing number of users
the demand for transactions amplified dramatically, which caused an increase in average fees. In worst
cases these fees reached $37 per transaction. The Lightning Network was utilized to resolve this issue.
Table 3 reports daily average Bitcoin transaction fees before and after an implementation of the
Lightning Network.7

4

https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
https://blockchain.info/ru/charts/avg-confirmation-time
6
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
7
https://bitcoinfees.info/
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C. Low level of anonymity.
A user of a Bitcoin wallet does not need to reveal his/her personal data. However, an owner of
the wallet has a unique wallet number (seed). Moreover, in order for Bitcoin’s blockchain blocks to
record data about previous and next block properly, information such as transaction time, amount
transacted, and seeds of two parties has to be public information, available to everyone.8 This structure
makes blockchain vulnerable to deanonymization and identity theft under constant and pedantic
observation of its cash flows. Case in point is the creator of Silk Road website, Ross William Ulbricht,
who was illegally trafficking narcotics and weapons through internet. He was caught partly due to the
low anonymity level of Bitcoin’s blockchain, which was used as a main payment method at Silk Road
(Popper, 2015).
These are three main drawbacks of a Bitcoin’s blockchain technology. Since Bitcoin’s source
code is open to the public, anyone has an ability to copy and modify it and many individuals attempt to
come up with ideas of system improvement.9 The accessibility of the code allured other programmers
into creating their own versions of cryptocurrencies, which latter would be called Altcoin.

1.5 Birth of an Altcoin market
The first documented attempt to solve issues associated with Bitcoin’s transaction time and high
fees was made by Charlie Lee and his project called Litecoin10 11. Since Bitcoin has an open code, Lee
simply copied it and built extra lines of code above it. This process was later named “Hard Fork”. Litecoin
had bigger coin supply, which increased liquidity of Litecoins, decreased block creation time from 10
minutes to 2.5 minutes and significantly decreased time and fees for transactions, but increased the
chance of hackers’ attack due to low requirements of processing power12.
There were many other attempts and hard forks to improve initial Bitcoin code. By 2013, people
interested in cryptocurrency market could buy Bitcoin, Litecoin, Peercoin, Namecoin, Terracoin, Devcoin
and Novacoin.13 Each of the cryptocurrencies had unique features, but the main principle for all of them
remained the same: To find a perfect balance between transaction time and an amount of fees paid to
miners, given an appropriate security level of blockchain networks.
The main purpose of cryptocurrencies was to serve as a worldwide, just and convenient
intermediate of exchange without any third party intervention (Greenberg, 2011). However, the
technological and cryptographic pillar of any cryptocurrency, Blockchain, had much higher potential and
value creation factors than just to be used only in cryptocurrency market. The first successful attempt to
use blockchain technology for purposes other than utilization within cryptocurrency industry was made
by Vitalik Buterin in his project called “Ethereum” (Aitken, 2016).
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See, "When should Litecoin be launched?" https://bitcointalk.org/
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1.6 Birth of an Altcoin market: A smart-contract platform
Unlike other prior blockchain projects, Ethereum is not “hard forked”, but instead created from
scratch. Ethereum’s blockchain is similar to Bitcoin’s, except for a very important add-on: It has specific
cryptographic contracts that “encode the bylaws of an entire organization”14. This add-on allows a
creation of an irreversible contract, called “Smart-contract”, inside the Ethereum platform.15 Thus
making possible not only currency transactions, but any other conditional cooperation in a blockchain
system by users, which are specified in this contract. For example, simple Java code depicted in
Illustration 1 shows encode condition for a grading policy. If, let say, a university would adopt blockchain
technology and sign in all professors and their grading policy into this blockchain system, student who is
looking for the specific professor with specific grading policy will look through smart-contract’s
conditions in this blockchain system, and sign (sign up for the course in this case) such contract that is
the most appropriate for him. In our case, grading policy is set in such way that it has no “+” or “-“
grades. Student who looks for such grading policy in blockchain had to look through all encoded smartcontracts and eventually find the one that does not include “+” and “-“. On the other hand, if university
would use blockhain without smart-contracts in it, it would be impossible for the university to code any
conditional cooperation between blocks (in our case between teachers and students). The only one
option which would be available to the students in such blockchain would be to sign up or not for the
specific course. However, using blockchain with the integrated smart-contracts, students would be able
to sign up for the specific course if a grading policy of the teacher excludes “+” and “-“.

1.7 Birth of an Altcoin market: Tokens
The add-on of smart-contracts gives myriad ways to use blockchain technology in new,
unexplored ways. Blockchain without smart-contracts is predetermined, one-dimensional transaction
application. Blockchain with smart-contract is the simulation of people’s real life action in legal field,
Internet, and an IT world under full democracy, which implies equal trust and equal possibilities for each
user.
Vitalik Buterin predicted that blockchain with integrated smart-contract technology would
create a boom in the use and implementation of blockchain technology in a day-to-day life:
“What is more interesting about Ethereum, however, is that the Ethereum protocol
moves far beyond just currency. Protocols and decentralized applications around
decentralized file storage, decentralized computation and decentralized prediction
markets, among dozens of other such concepts, have the potential to substantially
increase the efficiency of the computational industry, and provide a massive boost to
other peer-to-peer protocols by adding for the first time an economic layer. Finally, there
is also a substantial array of applications that have nothing to do with money at all.16”
14

http://www.the-blockchain.com/docs/Ethereum_white_papera_next_generation_smart_contract_and_decentralized_application_platform-vitalik-buterin.pdf
15
"Smart Contracts, Explained". Coin telegraph. 31 October 2017.
16
http://www.theblockchain.com/docs/Ethereum_white_papera_next_generation_smart_contract_and_decentral
ized_application_platform-vitalik-buterin.pdf
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Indeed, after a while, such companies as Starjcoin (allows users to buy and borrow data
storage), Unikoin Gold (e-gaming), and Basic Attention Token (a web-browser) started to use Ethereum’s
smart-contract technology.17 18 19 Such applications create ecosystems, where users with the help of
blockchain and smart-contract technologies exchange their valuable resources. The medium of
exchange in such ecosystems are “tokens” which are issued before the launch of blockchain.

1.8 Ecosystems’ economy and value creation factors
There is no single, registered, and well-established practice as to how applications, associated
with blockchain, smart-contracts, cryptocurrency and, more generally, FinTech industry, start a value
creation process. Currently, the most widespread way is to show start-up’s concept and try to raise
initial capital for the project. Once a White Paper is published, a company attempts to raise capital for its
implementation. The method of raising capital is quite unique, however. It is known as an “Initial Coin
Offering (ICO)”.20 The technical aspect of an ICO is almost identical to an IPO (Initial Public Offering),
except for the fact that in an ICO there are typically no any third-party consultants who provide
evaluation of IPO, registration of a newly issued stock on stock exchange platforms, etc. Moreover,
capital raised through an IPO always represents the partial ownership of the company (or debt),
whereas an ICO product (tokens) does not always mean the same thing.21 Different types of tokens are
categorized by the source of their value derivative. Again, the categorization, names, and technical
aspects of the tokens follow from the practical cases, because at this stage of their evolution, there is no
well-established or “official” database.

1.9 Types of tokens
According to Zetzsche (2018), the most widespread types of tokens presented during the ICO
and its value deriving factors are:






Asset Tokens – tokens which are backed by assets of the company.
Equity Tokens – tokens that represent a claim on the future revenue of the company.
Utility Tokens – tokens that represent a claim on the issued product of the company.
Governing Tokens – tokens constituting the right of decision-making on company’s behalf.
Community Tokens – tokens granting a right to be a part of a close community.

Some tokens could represent more than one function. According to analysis most tokens are
“Utility Tokens” or similar (68% of the overall market) (Milano, 2018). It seems to be an accurate
estimate, because most companies create nothing but an ecosystem for their own users. Such
ecosystems cannot generate any revenue for its creators, so Equity Tokens are worthless in that sense.
Once a project is complete, Governing Tokens devalue as well. Moreover, majority of such companies
17

https://storj.io/
https://unikoingold.com/
19
https://basicattentiontoken.org/
20
https://www.sec.gov/ICO
21
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stock.asp
18
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utilize extremely low amount of tangible assets, which makes Asset Tokens inapplicable to a fundraising
activity. Lastly, Community Tokens are employed only in narrowly-specialized projects. Hence,
fundraising is mainly accomplished by Utility Tokens: They represent the right to buy some product from
other user of an ecosystem.
For example, let’s consider Storj. 22 Their tokens are Utility Tokens which allow to buy free disk
space of other users, and to collect one’s data on their disk space. It guarantees security by
cryptographic encryption, so only one individual can get an access to initial data. To utilize other users’
disk space, one must pay them a Utility Token (a Storjcoin). The owner of the Utility Tokens can use
them to borrow space from another user, or sell those Tokens on a crypto exchange platform. The price
of those tokens (in USD) depends upon the forces of demand and supply. Since there is a limited amount
of Storjcoins (500,000,000 coins), the price of each coin would vary in accordance with the Nominal GDP
formula (see Illustration 2).
This concludes a short overview crypto market’s proliferation from DigiCash, founded in 1989, to
present days (See Pitta, 1999). This paper, however, goes beyond cryptocurrencies and blockchain
ecosystem platforms. It discusses a topic of ICO technology for mainstream industries and companies
which do not simply provide a platform (juxtaposing buyers and sellers), but appear as a seller itself by
providing services and products. Blockchain and smart-contract technology could go far beyond
cryptocurrencies and virtual applications: In conjunction with an ICO system it could be a viable
alternative to raising capital through VC. In addition, it could be an impactful instrument for reducing a
company’s cost of capital and a value-creating tool for stockholders.

2.0 ICO capabilities in mainstream industries
With the help of new technology, and power that a distributed ledger system provides,
companies are able to expand their spectrum of issued financial securities to raise an appropriate
amount of capital for their needs. The newly issued securities (Tokens) would be distributed with the
help of blockchain. The price associated with the issuance would be much lower than an average price
of a venture capital benchmark. If a company decides to use a more difficult approach, and not use
existing blockchain (smart-contract running platforms such as Euthereum, NEO or Omni), but to create
their own exclusive blockchain platform, the one-time cost would be around $102,500, and a price for
consequent issuance of additional tokens would be around $17,000.23 However, it is not an exclusive
method to issue new tokens. As an alternative, an external blockchain network can be utilized. In this
case, a company has to pay additional fees as rent, but does not have to spend money to create its own
blokchain network. For example, IBM offers such services for $1000 fee. 24 In addition to this recurring
fee, a company would have to pay around $93,500 in legal, web-site management, and tokens
origination fees as a one-time cost. Moreover, the cost of subsequent tokens issued would be around
$18,000. The best option for the company depends on the frequency of usage factor: How often will
22

https://storj.io/
https://medium.com/@merunasgrincalaitis/what-it-takes-to-create-a-successful-ico-how-expensive-it-is-yourcomplete-guide-35912722351e
24
https://console.bluemix.net/catalog/services/blockchain?cm_mc_uid=08428778273715154551697&cm_mc_sid
_50200000=72884981520895828762&cm_mc_sid_52640000=38290101520884846733
23
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tokens be utilized as the method of an additional capital raising and what an interest rate is expected to
be. For example, according to calculations provided, the break-even point is 18.3 years for issuing given
the perspective annualized interest rate of 2.9%. If a company would do it for a shorter period of time,
it would be better off renting a blockchain platform rather than creating a new one (see Illustration 3).
Another interesting question is what conditions are necessary for new tokens to be issued and
how blockchain users can predict these conditions. The latter part of the question is easy to resolve.
Users would know about tokens’ issuance conditions with the help of smart-contract technology.
Moreover, they would buy the newly issued tokens with the help of smart-contract technology. As was
mentioned earlier, smart-contracts allow any conditional cooperation inside a blockchain network. Thus,
a combination of blockchain and smart-contract technologies allows companies to issue new financial
securities at exceptionally low costs, fast speed and without any third-party intervention.
A more challenging question would be presented about the kind of conditions necessary for
those tokens to be appealing to investors and to be competitive enough in comparison to bonds and
stocks. For now, there are five main strategies that a company could use to give its tokens some value.
1. Asset Token – since an asset itself would not generate any revenue for holders of assets token,
there would not be any incentive for investors to hold those Asset Tokens during the upturn of
economy. On the other hand, an Asset Token would be competitive option for investors during
the economic downturn. Since economic downturns accompanied by high inflation of
government’s currency and uncertainty, people would be interested in investing their money
into something stable, e.g., tangible assets. For example, if a conservative investor anticipates a
future economic downturn, he might consider saving his money with the help of Asset Tokens.
According to his estimation, he thinks that General Motors assets (e.g., machinery) would not be
outdated, and thus, would not devaluate, which means his Asset Tokens would have the same
amount of value through time. However, during flourishing economy, where people are
interested not in saving their money but increasing them, Asset Tokens would not be a great
option for a company to raise additional capital, since it would not have a lot of demand from
investors’ side.
2. Equity Token – unlike Assets Tokens, Equity Tokens would generate revenue for its holders. In
some sense an Equity Token would have some functions of companies’ stocks. However, unlike
stocks, Equity Tokens would not imply a partial ownership of the company. Equity Tokens
holders would have a claim only on the revenue of the firm. This principal difference between
an Equity Token and a stock has a crucial impact on demand, required rate of return and issuer’s
interests which will be discussed further.
3. Utility Token – unlike Equity Token, Utility Token holders would have a claim not on the revenue
of a company but on the specific product of this company, or the revenue generated from the
sale of one unit of the particular product. If not obvious at first glance, there is a big difference
between Equity and Utility Tokens. Holders of Utility Tokens do not have any interest in general
success of the company, as it was in the case of Equity Token holders. Utility Token holders are
interested in high demand for company’s product and its quality. This would lead to a shift of a
required rate of return for this Token from investor’s side and a general strategy of issuance of
this type of Token for issuer, which will be discussed further.
4. Governing Tokens – the only utility, from which this type of Token derives value is the lust of
power. However, since the holder of a Governing Token would not have any interest to increase
8

the production value of the firm (because he would not have any claim for this newly created
value, e.g., dividends), such Tokens would create costly conflict of interest between holders of
Governing Tokens and holders of all other tokens and venture capitalists. Thus, issuance of such
Tokens would cause a big problem for the overall health of the firm through a conflict of
interests and a highly volatile price for such Tokens, since the main source of value depends
upon subjective evaluation and a general sentiment of the market. In the regular stock case,
governing is integrated into the structure, and is a much better option to raise capital since
conflict of interest is eliminated by claims on dividends.
5. Community Tokens – similar to Governing Tokens, a Community Token derives its value from
highly subjective nature: The right to be a part of a close, elite community. Even if the concept
of a Community Token would work for some highly unique non-profit organizations, it is
extremely hard to find an appropriate usage of this type of token for a commercial company.
Thus, Community Tokens is an inadequate way to raise firm’s capital, since the nature of value
of this Token is undefined.

3.0 Equity and Utility Tokens as a fundraising tool
It is clear from the discussion above that Equity and Utility tokens would create the most utility
for the company in fundraising. Hence, it is important to provide more details and understand what kind
of new possibilities Equity and Utility Tokens as financial instruments could offer to an issuer and
investors.

3.1 Equity Tokens
Depending upon the nature of Equity Tokens, discount rate on certain dollar amount, or certain
percentage amount from the whole net income for some time period, a conflict of interests between
Token holders and stockholders would be minimal.

3.1.1 Equity Tokens that are based on a certain dollar amount of all Net Income
for a given time period ($ Equity Tokens)
This type of Equity Tokens would have a structure that is closer to the discount bonds rather
than common stocks. The essence of this type of a token is that an issuer sells it initially using a certain
discount rate, and later repurchases those same tokens at the face value. An essential difference from a
bond would be that if a firm did not generate any dividends, the firm would not be obligated to pay it
until a certain date but rather transfer the payment to the next time period. Due to this unique nature
of the token, a company would be able to borrow funds, but those borrowed funds would not make it
more conservative, and thus, would not add any financial distress costs (as opposed to issued bonds).
For example, a bond has the last coupon payment due on December 31, 2010. The coupon has the face
value of $1,000. However, on December 31, 2010 a company does not have enough funds to make the
coupon payment. Thus, the last payment would transfer from 31st of December, 2010 to the next
payment period (in this case, July 1st, 2011) and a face value would increase by the amount of the
premium which was discussed in a smart-contract beforehand.
9

3.1.2 Equity Tokens that are based on a percent of all Net Income for a given time
period (% Equity Tokens)
Like $ Equity Tokens, this type of tokens would not create any conflict of interests between
stakeholders, since both token holders and stockholders would be interested in revenue growth.
Moreover, % Equity Token holders would be even more liberal than $ Equity Token holders, since for %
Equity Token holders the total amount of Net Income is important, since they have a certain percentage
claim on it25. However, for $ Token Equity holders it is only important that Net Income would achieve a
certain level, and after that certain level $ Token Equity holders would be interested in a more
conservative behavior because any earnings above that level would not be distributed among $ Token
Equity holders. In sum, the overall picture is presented in Equation 1:
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠: 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 > $ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 > % 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛

(1)

Here, bond holders are indifferent to the total amount of net income, $ Equity Token holders
are interested in net income until some certain level, and % Equity Token holders are interested in the
entire net income amount.

3.1.3 $ Equity Tokens vs. % Equity Tokens
The question is what type of Equity Tokens is better for a firm to issue? To answer this question,
it is important to consider following factors:
1. Additional risk of % Equity Tokens Vs. decreased financial distress costs – in theory, investors’
required rate of return (RRT) for % Equity Tokens would be higher than RRT for $ Equity Tokens
because of Net Income volatility and thus, volatility of expected gain in $ amount vs. real gain in
$ amount of % Equity Tokens. On the other hand, % Equity Tokens decrease financial distress
costs in comparison to $ Equity Tokens. Both company and % Equity Token holders are
interested in increasing revenue as much as possible. Thus, for a company, before decision
about what type of Equity Tokens to utilize, it is important to consider:
𝑅𝑅𝑇 𝑜𝑓 % 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠 − 𝑅𝑅𝑇 𝑜𝑓 $ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠
<? >
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 % 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠 − 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 $ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠
A firm would have to decide which type of Equity Token would be better based upon an analysis
of current Debt-to-Equity ratio, anticipated RRTs, and current subjective financial distress costs.
2. A company’s anticipated net income Vs. market’s anticipation of a company’s net income –
Ceteris Paribus, if a company determines that it could generate more net income than what the
market predicts, it would be better to issue $ Equity Tokens since investors would be more
25

Here, and further on, I assume no extra premium for a coupon payment date transfer for a $ Equity Token. All
extra risks associated with the coupon payment date transfer are discounted from an initial price of a $ Equity
Token.
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interested to invest in less volatile and more certain ways of funding. On the other hand, if a
company is more optimistic than the market about its net income, any additional net income
generated would flow to stockholders (as retained earnings), since Equity Tokens were attached
to $ amount.
On the other hand, if a company is more pessimistic about its net income than the
market, it should issue % Equity Tokens because investors (through their optimism) would
create a larger demand for these types of tokens which would decrease its RRT and the
company would achieve its token repurchase stage easily. Hence, if the company indeed
performed poorly, and does not have a lot of net income, it would pay out not a $ amount but a
% amount from its net Income.

3.1.4 A combination of $ Equity Token and % Equity Token
It makes sense to issue both types of tokens since it would decrease a company’s timing risk. For
example, if a company cannot anticipate a future considerable increase in net income and acts more
pessimistic, it can issue 100% of % Equity Token and it will distribute a big portion of increased net
income, which otherwise would stay within a company (if a company were to issue 100% of $ Equity
Tokens). On the other hand, if a company was excessively optimistic, it would issue 100% of $ Equity
Tokens, and will have to repurchase those $ Equity Tokens for the total price, which would be much
higher in comparison to 100% financing by % Equity Tokens. Thus, the strategy to issue portions of both
types of Tokens would make cash flows less volatile and decrease the severity of the mistake of issuing
wrong security in the wrong time.

3.2 Equity Tokens - Increased Cash Flow Stability
Blockchain gives an opportunity to issue Tokens quickly and at relatively low costs. This
important feature of blockchain could be used by companies operating in industries with volatile cash
flows and a small amount of tangible assets (e.g., Biotech industry). These types of companies cannot
allow themselves to have large debt-to-equity ratios (e.g., Biotech’s average ratio is 15.8%) because of
aforementioned factors26. However, with Equity Tokens these companies would have a chance to gain
additional capital by pre-selling its future net income, which would allow to stabilize a company’s cash
flow, and thus, increase its debt-to-equity ratio to find new optimal breakeven point of the cost of
capital. By utilizing tokens, such companies would be able to issue new securities and raise additional
capital to cover its coupon payments due, prior to reaching the point of not having enough funds to
cover them because of the lack of free cash flow or lack of tangible assets for sale.

3.3 Equity Tokens – Capital concentration and integration
Since Equity Token holders have claim not on assets but on the net income of the company, the
holders of capital remain the same. In fact, this decreases the costs associated with atomization of
26

http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/wacc.htm
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capital, which Stockholders encounter during the stock issuance (e.g., mail price, complex decisionmaking process, etc.)

3.4 Equity Tokens – Easy start-up opportunity
Although this advantage of Equity Tokens is not applicable to well-established companies, still, it
is important to consider that Equity Tokens give enormous opportunities for a start-up development.
This method is not new, since there is Equity I Crowdfunding which uses the same mechanism as Equity
Tokens method.27 However, with blockchain and smart-contract technology the process of fundraising
for startup projects would be increased through efficiency and decrease in costs associated with it.

3.5 Equity Tokens – Market transparency
Newly issued Equity Tokens available for everyone who has funds to buy them and an access to
the internet. Thus, when firms release their Tokens, potentially all market participants, domestic and
international, would know about that. This feature makes tokens market very allocation efficient. On the
other hand, stock and bond markets cannot provide such possibility, since there are multiple steps and a
whole hierarchy of brokers if investor wants to buy a foreign security.

3.6 Equity Tokens – less investors sentiment due to more pragmatic approach
Tokens’ price volatility would be lower on primary and initial markets because of the nature of
the security. It is important to consider investors’ sentiment in $ Equity Tokens market and sentiment on
% Equity Tokens market.

3.6.1 An extent of sentiment in a % Equity Token market
Since a % Equity Token is a security which is backed up by % of net income, the real value of
those tokens would be less volatile than Venture Capital. That is true because the source of real value of
Venture Capital has a much broader spectrum than the token market. This broad spectrum is subjected
to a less in-depth valuation and a bigger portion of sentiment which leads to security volatility. For
example, Argenti and Druckenmiller (2003) try to prove that the stock market tends to overreact to bad
news in the media and a downturn of a company’s reputation. The main reason why the market is
overreacting is that this downturn in reputation does not lead to as big of a loss in a value creation
ability of the firm as it is anticipated by investors, which is reflected in the net income of the company.
% Equity Token eliminates such sentiment by narrowing the source of real value creation factor to net
income only.

27

https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-rule506htm.html
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For example, if the CEO of General Electric (GE) is caught in theft, in theory, it would change the
equity portion of GE since investors would have their subjective ideology about what is good or bad, and
do they want to be the partial owners of the company whose CEO is dishonest. At the same time, the
value creation machine of GE would be changed not as dramatically, as it is anticipated by investors
since costumers would continue to use products and services made by GE and would pay almost the
same price for it. This means that the net income would not be negatively affected, which, in turn means
that the securities which rely only on net income of the company (which is % Equity Token, in our case)
would be unchanged. The fact that % Equity Tokens rely on a very pragmatic value (% amount of Net
Income) allows to remove a large portion of investors’ sentiment from the Token market and to stabilize
cash flows. Whereas VC would be a subject to such sentiment.

3.6.2 An extent of sentiment in $ Equity Token market
An extent of sentiment for both $ Equity Token and % Equity Token holders is quite similar. The
main difference is that the stability of $ Equity Token would be distributed unequally among $ Token
holders if company would have a potential threat of a decreasing net income. Whereas a potential
change in net income would impact all % Equity holders equally. This is a case because every subsequent
$ Token Holder would have less and less chance to get paid out of the next net income distribution. On
the other hand, % Token holder would get paid in 100% of the time, but for the $ Token holder amount
of the payment would vary, and this variation would have an impact on all $ Equity Holders. As shown in
Illustration 4, the Present Value of % Equity Tokens would be decreased equally among all holders of this
security:
𝑦
𝑌
𝑉
𝑉
−𝐾 ⟶
−𝐾
(1 + 𝑅)1
(1 + 𝑅)1
Name
Payment Period
Initial Token Price
Expected Net Income
# of Token Issued
Future Value of Token

$ Equity Token
Nx
C-gn28
Y
V
𝛿29

% Equity Token
Nx
K
Y
V

Discount Free Rate

(1+R)N

(1+R)N

𝑌
𝑉

Whereas Present Value of $ Equity Tokens would not only depend upon the amount of decreasing of:
𝑌 → 𝑦, 𝑌 > 𝑦
28

C – gn; where C – price for the first $ Equity Token, gn – discount for subsequent $ Equity Token predetermined
by arithmetic sequence such as: gn+1 = ngn. This equation is applicable to theoretical situation when each
subsequent token has the same ΔRisk for delayed payment.
29
It is the main difference between $ and % Equity Tokens. FV of $ Equity Tokens do not depend upon Expected
Net Income, they aimed to set FV of 𝛿, whereas FV of % Equity Tokens depend upon the final amount of Net
Income gained by the company
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but also the place of the token in claim priority of each $ Equity Token, which is N in C-gn formula. The
final formula for PV of the specific Token and the number of the order of the Net Income, which covered
this token is:

𝑋1
𝑋2
𝑋3
𝑋α
𝑋α+1
− 𝐶,
− 𝑐 + 𝑔,
− 𝑐 + 2𝑔, … ,
− 𝑐 + (α − 1)𝑔,
− 𝑐 + α𝑔, …
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)𝑎
𝑋β
𝑋β+1
𝑋α+2
𝑋V
,
− 𝑐 + (α + 1)𝑔, … +
− 𝑐 + (β − 1)𝑔,
− 𝑐 + (β − 1)𝑔, … ,
− 𝑐 + (V − 1)𝑔
𝑎
𝑎
β
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)V
; 𝑦𝑎 < 𝑉𝑋; 𝑦 β < (𝑉 − α)𝑋; 𝑦γ < (𝑉 − α − β)𝑋; … ; 𝑦ᾠ > (𝑉 − α − β … − ᾠ)X

Thus, both $ and % Equity Tokens would be less volatile than VC securities. However, both
Tokens would have a unique path of volatility and they could be used in different ways. For example, $
Equity Token volatility could be used as an indicator of very accurate anticipated monetary amount of
future net income of the firm. This is the case because of the significant downturn of PV of subsequent $
Equity Token which is located on the margin between two different rounds of token repurchase. This
property of $ Equity Tokens could be seen from part of above formula:
…,

𝑋α
𝑋α+1
− 𝑐 + (α − 1)𝑔,
− 𝑐 + α𝑔, …
(1 + 𝑅 )
(1 + 𝑅)𝑎

The significance jump in the denominator from (1+R)1 to (1+R)a would be a signal for the firm
that the market predicts that next distribution of net income would cover only Xa tokens. Thus, market’s
anticipated net income would be:

𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = δ𝑋𝑎
𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 =

δ𝑋𝑎
(1 + 𝑅)

On the other hand, % Equity Tokens could give a company some important information as well.
𝑌

For example, the overall demand and the difference between Future Value of % Equity Token ( 𝑉 ) and
required discount rate by investors (K) for % Equity Tokens indicate the extent of investor’s trust of
company.

4.0 Utility Tokens as a fundraising method
As stated above, Utility Tokens would have a claim not on the revenue of the company but on
the specific product of this company or the revenue, which was generated from the sale of that one unit
of the product. This specific collateral of the token, not on $ amount of net income or % amount of net
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income, but a specific product and the amount of value which it gives to the market would give unique
advantages and disadvantages to both investors and issuers.

4.1 Utility Tokens – Unique issuer’s advantages
There are 2 main unique advantages of Utility Tokens for the issuer of this type of security, as
compared to $ and % Equity Tokens.

4.1.1 Utility Token as a reinsurance tool
With the help of Utility Token a company would be able to sell its future service or product
today. This function of Utility Token would be a great method for the company to lock up the value
which this product or service brings to the market, and thus coordinate its future actions more wisely.
One anecdotal application for such financial instrument would be a company that produces
widget spinners. Recently, the sales of widget spinners declined significantly.30 If the company would
have anticipated this future decline of the demand for its product, they could have “shorted”
themselves with the help of Utility Tokens. The process would be as follows:
1. A company anticipates the future decline of its service or product value.
2. The company releases Utility Tokens attached to the value of this service or product.
3. The market value for this Utility Token would derive from today’s value for this service and
product.
4. If the company was correct and the demand for their products declines, hence the market price
of Utility Tokens would decline as well.
5. After the due date, the company repurchases tokens with at the lower price.
6. The Present Value of the firm, which was created with the help of this security would be:
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 −

𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒) 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
(1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)

It could be inferred that under such scenario, a Utility Token would serve a function, like the
function of derivative securities, because the company and investors are making bets about future value
of something (in this case, company’s future service of product). Thus, the Utility Token for a company,
just like the derivative instrument for an investor, would be a good method to:
1. Gain extra cash by predicting future behavior of the market toward a company’s product or
service.
2. Or, simply secure themselves from unexpected changes in the market behavior and by this,
stabilize company’s cash flows.

30

http://time.com/money/4800224/fidget-spinner-fad-over/
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4.1.2 Utility Token as an indicator of market’s sentiment
With the help of Utility Token’s market strike price, a company would be able to make
judgements about market sentiment toward the future value of their product or service. All company
should do is compare:
𝑃𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 ≡

𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
(1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)

and determine the correlation of the left and right side of the equations. If
𝑃𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 <

𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
(1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)

market anticipate the future rise of company’s service or product value. If
𝑃𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 >

𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
(1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)

then the reverse is applicable: Market anticipates the depreciation of company’s service or product
value. Moreover, with the help of this formula, a company would be able not only recognize general
optimism or pessimism of the market but the extent of this optimism or pessimism by the amount of the
difference between the left and right sides of the formula.

4.2 Common benefits of Utility and Equity Tokens vs. VC
Beside aforementioned unique benefits of Utility Tokens for the company, Utility Tokens have
some shared benefits with Equity Tokens which is not relevant to VC securities such as stocks and bonds.

4.2.1 Common benefits of Utility and Equity Tokens – Cash flow stabilization
A company would be able to issue its securities at the relatively low price with the help of
blockchain and smart-contract technologies. These securities would allow a company to stabilize its cash
flows, which would be extremely important for the companies possessing mostly intangible assets,
volatile cash flows, and hence, small leverage.
With the help of Equity Tokens a company would be able to pre-distribute its future net income,
collect cash during the ICO, and cover its spending, investing, and obligation expenses.
By employing Utility Tokens a company would be able to presale its future released products
and services, collect cash during the ICO, and cover its spending, investing, and obligations expenses.

4.2.2 Common benefits of Utility and Equity Tokens – Integrated politics of the
company
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Neither Utility Tokens nor Equity Tokens imply claims on the partial ownership of the company.
This allows not to disseminate capital, which allows for more integrated politics of the company and
costs reduction, which are associated with capital distribution.

4.2.3 Common benefits of Utility and Equity Tokens – Easy Start Up Opportunity
Right now, the concept of ICO is mostly used by initial fundraising for some project or concept.
There are several reasons for that:
1.
2.
3.
4.

ICO is a lot cheaper and more efficient than an IPO.
ICO provides demand from investors with the internet connection from all around the world.
The market is not regulated, which decreases the legal fees.
The only requirement is a White Paper with custom level of project description.

So, if a company wants to use ICO as the main method to raise first capital it could use both Utility
Tokens and Equity Tokens based upon their strategy.

4.2.4 Common benefits of Utility and Equity Tokens – Low issuance price
Both Equity and Utility Tokens are based on the distribution ledger technology, or blockchain.
This technology allows an issuance of both types of tokens at relatively low costs, which was discussed
in Section 2.0.

4.2.5 Common benefits of Utility and Equity Tokens – World free trade
Blockchain technology allows for both types of tokens to be available for sale in the entire
world. Every internet user could potentially become an investor in Utility or Equity Tokens. This market
openness allows a token market be as efficient as possible and eliminates all costs associated with
information asymmetry, insider trading, etc.

4.2.6 Common benefits of Utility and Equity Tokens – Less volatile security prices
vs. VC instruments
As mentioned in section 3.6 – 3.6.2, a source of value of Equity Tokens has less spectrum than
VC securities which eliminates some portion of sentiment from an Equity Token market. This feature is
inherent in a Utility Token as well, since the value of the Utility Token is attached to the only value of the
service or product of the company.

4.3.0 Disadvantages of Utility Tokens
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Even though Utility Tokens have some unique positive features (and some positive features that
are common for both Utility and Equity tokens), they also have some bad qualities which worsens their
position as a competitive financial instrument.

4.3.1 Disadvantages of Utility Tokens – Legal uncertainty
The unconventional structure of the Utility Token creates some technical problems associated
with security for the investor. The problem is that the Utility Token could be used as a real product, or as
a security, depending upon investor’s choice. For example, if an investor has no interest in revenue, but
only in the product itself (he just wants to buy a product or service to be released by the company at
some point of time in the future, at the discount rate), such investor would not want the company to
repurchase his token at the market price, but just provide him with a product backed up by this token. In
this case, Utility Token does not pass a Howey Test, which means the Utility Token is not a security.
On the other hand, if the buyer of Utility Token does not want to get a product or service, but
wants to receive the equivalent cash amount instead (based on the market price of the product), the
Utility Token passes the Howey Test, which makes the Utility Token a security.
This issue with the Utility Token creates an uncertainty and associated with it extra costs of legal
investigations into the appropriate definition and set of rules for Utility Token market regulations.
One possible solution is to divide a Utility Token into 2 or 3 subcategories. These categories
could be:
1. A Consumer Utility Token – a Utility Token which will be exchanged only for the collateral
product or service of the token in the future time period.
2. An Investor Utility Token – a Utility Token which will be exchanged only for a cash equivalent
amount of the collateral product or service of the token in the future time period.
3. A Convertible Utility Token – a Utility Token which will be exchanged either for the collateral
product or service of this token or for the cash equivalent amount of the collateral product or
service of the token in the future time period.
Under this scenario litigation would be eliminated in the case of Consumer Utility Token and
Investor Utility Token since it is going to be clear (and according to Howey Test), that a Consumer Utility
Token would not be considered a security, and an Investor Utility Token would be considered a security.
A Convertible Utility Token would remain unresolved since its double jeopardy. If SEC cannot define a
set of rules for the Convertible Utility Token, it could simply be prohibited and not used by the
companies. However, it is preferred that the set of rules for Convertible Utility Token be determined
since it would have more demand than Consumer or Investor Utility Tokens by investors, since it
provides more alternatives. On the other hand, a company would be indifferent between issuing
Consumer, Investor or Convertible Utility Tokens since in all cases the company would give the
product/service (or a cash equivalent) to its investors. Thus, a Convertible Utility Token has a big
potential to allow companies presell its products and services with relatively smaller discount rate in
comparison to Consumer and Investor Utility Tokens, because of higher amount of demand from
investor side for such tokens.
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4.3.2 Disadvantages of Utility Tokens – Technological barrier
The technological problem is associated with the complexity of blockchain which will be used as
a platform for Utility Tokens’ ICO. To understand the problem, it is necessary to consider how the
Investor or Convertible Utility Token buyback would happen. Presumably, it will happen in the following
way:
1. A company initiates an ICO of an Investor/Convertible Utility Token.
2. An Investor registers on a blockchain platform, reads a smart-contract associated with the
conditions of Investor/Convertible Utility Token security, and buys it.
3. A new product/service, which is associated with these Utility Tokens, is released.
4. Costumers buy the new service/product and the payment for this service/product is instantly
transferred to the Investor/Convertible Utility Token investor, and the company buys back the
initial token.
The technical problem is associated with the 4th stage of this process. Since blockchain is
decentralized, a company would not be able to buy back the token for the certain price. The company
should confirm that a costumer, indeed, bought some service/product for the certain price and that this
product was backed up by the certain Investor/Convertible Utility Token which company tries to buy
back. Only in this case, the initial smart-contract which was used for the ICO would work. There are two
main alternatives how the company could behoove to the smart-contract:
1. Register every costumer, who bought a product which was associated with an
Investor/Convertible Utility Token. If there is a registered costumer in a blockchain system who
would confirm that he or she is an actual buyer of the product, and there is a third party in a
smart-contract to run through this smart-contract, and thus, finish three-party-transaction.

Buyer

Cash

Cash

Company

Investor
Token

Product

However, the costumer’s registration in a company’s blockchain would take a considerable
amount of time, which will result in deterioration of customer service and the overall impression
of the costumer about the company. Thus, if company does not want to treat its costumer in
such way, there is a second option available for them.
2. Register every product, which is associated with the Utility Token in a company’s blockchain. In
this case, costumers do not need to spend their time to be registered in the blockchain.
However, to be registered in the blockchain, a product at least must have an internet
connection. In theory, such product would have a special chip which allows it to be in “online”
status in the company’s blockchain. The whole concept of products which are connected to a
blockchain is called the “Internet of Things” (IoT) (Brown, 2016). It is not a well-established
market and such “chips” are in the “research” stage so far. There are several companies who are
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trying to implement such concepts, such as Ayla, Bosch, and Fujitsu. 31 32 33 The costs of such
technologies are not available so far but it is possible to imply that it is going to be costly in
terms of money and in terms of inefficiency of such technologies, since they would be new and
cursory researched. Thus, none of the decision is a perfect one and the solution is linked to a
cost and customer service trade off.

4.3.3 Disadvantages of Utility Tokens – Information disclosure
One more negative side of Utility Tokens is the hardship associated with Utility Tokens which are
attached to an exclusive type of service or product. One good example could be the market for
smartphones. For now, the hype and uniqueness of the new version of the old smartphone is a big part
of this market. However, the opacity of the information about the future characteristics of the new
smartphone would make a task of determining its future value extremely hard. This, in turn, would
create some disadvantages for issuance of the Utility Tokens for this smartphone. The first problem is
the price volatility of such Utility Tokens in the secondary market. Since there would be no official
information about the future smartphone, the real value of the Utility Token would be totally subjective
to the investors. Moreover, without official information about future characteristics of the smartphone,
investors would react to every rumor about the future model of a smartphone which would create even
more volatility and give leverage of Utility Token market control to a third party, in our case, fake news
websites.
One possible approach to avoid that is to disclose some information about main characteristics
of the products to the potential Utility Token buyers. However, such strategy would ruin the hype and
excitement atmosphere before an actual release of the product, which would result in a deterioration of
a “WOW” effect, and as a result, in the amount of sales of this new product.
Thus, there are three main solutions: Release Utility Tokens for exclusive products and do not
reveal any information about it, which would make the Utility Token market inadequate; release Utility
Tokens and reveal some information about the exclusive product, which would ruin excitement for this
product and, as a result, decrease its sales; or, do not use Utility Tokens for exclusive types of products
altogether.

4.3.4 Disadvantages of Utility Tokens – Conflict of interests
Since Utility Tokens allow the company to make a bet about the future value of its services and
products to the counterparty (investor), it would create a conflict of interest. There are two main types
of conflict of interest which could arise between an issuer of the Utility Token (a Company) and an
investor:

31

https://www.aylanetworks.com/
https://www.bosch-si.com/corporate/about-us/internet-of-things/iot.html
33
http://www.fujitsu.com/global/themes/internet-of-things/
32
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1. A Conflict of Quality – If a company would short itself, it would be in the company’s best interest
to save some value by decreasing the overall quality of the product or service issued. By doing
this, the company would save the value gained from decreased quality and still presell this lowquality product for the price of the Utility Token. An investor on the other hand, would not be
able to anticipate a significant future quality deterioration of the product and, as a result, would
buy the Token for the price of the discounted value of a high-quality product.
2. A Conflict of Quantity – If the price of the Utility Token is set, it would be in the companies’ best
interest to increase the amount of product produced no matter the price and the quantity of the
Utility Tokens sold. This, in turn, would decrease the value of the product produced, and the
Utility Token’s value, since its value derives only from this particular product. Thus, such
instrument as the Utility Token would inculcate the conflict of interests, based upon quality
produced, and, as a result, decrease the Utility Token’s and product’s price from 𝑓 (𝑋𝑎 ) to
𝑓(𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥)) (See Illustration 5).

5.0 The Formula of $ Equity Token’s value creation
5.1 An introduction to the Math Model
In this section there is an attempt to simulate the math model to understand under what
circumstances it would be valuable for the company to issue Tokens. The model would consider an issue
of $ Equity Tokens with certain price, coupons and an extra premium for every time a company misses a
coupon payment on $ Equity Token. With the help of such security, a company theoretically would be
able to stabilize its free cash flow, which could go to cover its debt obligations. Consequently, with more
stabilized free cash flow a company would be able to increase its Debt-to-Equity ratio, and hence,
decrease its venture capital cost (VC WACC). On the other hand, if a company issues $ Equity Tokens it
will be obligated to make extra payments depending upon the issuance conditions of such security.
Thus, $ Equity Tokens would decrease VC WACC on one hand, but create extra expenses on another.
It makes sense to take the Required Rate of Return (RRT) which is associated with $ Equity
Tokens issuance under uncertain variable X, and analyze the financial health of the firm under all
potential values of X. For the first stage of research, it makes sense to exclude such expenses as taxes,
broker’s payments, blockchain rent fees, and blockchain creation price to remove excessive complexity.
Thus, X would represent an interest rate (IR) required by investors on $ Equity Tokens.
𝑋% = 𝐼𝑅 𝑓𝑜𝑟 $ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑠
Since RRT could take on any value, both negative and positive, depending upon macroeconomic
trends, X could also have any value.
𝑅𝑅𝑇 ∈ [−∞: ∞]
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𝑋 ∈ [−∞: ∞]

The final goal of this research is to determine the monetary amount of value which $ Equity
Tokens create. For this purpose, it is necessary to find out what kind of benefits $ Equity Tokens give to
the company, and what extra costs it creates.

5.2 The model’s initial conditions
1. Company claims Earnings Before Interest % Tax (EBIT) semiannually. EBIT’s PDF is normally
distributed with mean of μ and standard deviation of σ.
𝐷

2. Company has certain debt-to-equity capital structure, it is 𝐸 . Cost of capital are Kd and Ke
respectively.
3. Company’s strategy is to borrow funds under certain confidence level of CL% and respective Z
score and $ amount of:
𝐶𝐿%
𝐶𝐿1 = 1 −
{
100
𝐹 = 𝝁 + 𝒁𝑪𝑳𝟏 𝝈
Where F – is $ amount of EBIT that company will get, or less than F, with the probability (p) of 1CL%/100%. Moreover, F is the exact number of coupon payments that company would be
obligated to pay.

5.3 Calculations- a positive side of $ Equity Tokens
Since a company’s cost of equity, debt, and an amount of debt and equity is known, VC WACC of
the company is as following:
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =

𝐷1
𝐸1
∗ 𝐾𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇) + ∗ 𝐾𝑒
𝑉1
𝑉1

Where,
𝑉1 = 𝐷1 + 𝐸1
Moreover, the interest expenses, which in our case are amounts of coupon payments, are
known:
𝐹1 = 𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿1 𝝈
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Where F is $ amount of coupon payments, 𝝁 is average EBIT of company from semiannual to
semiannual, 𝑍𝐶𝐿1 score of confidence level limited by left normal, and 𝝈 standard deviation of EBIT from
semiannual to semiannual.
Thus, it is possible to calculate the amount of all company’s debt (D) in terms of amount of
coupon payments (F). Since coupon payments represent the $ amount of investor’s interest rate, the
total amount of all debt would be
𝐷1 =

𝐹
𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿1 𝝈
=
𝐾𝑑
𝐾𝑑

Consequently, total amount of VC capital is:
𝑉1 = 𝐷1 + 𝐸1 =

𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿1 𝝈
+ 𝐸1
𝐾𝑑

Finally, company’s WACC is:
𝝁+𝑍

𝐷

𝐸

𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑉 ∗ 𝐾𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇) + 𝑉 ∗ 𝐾𝑒 =

𝝈
𝐶𝐿1
𝐾𝑑

𝑉

𝐸

∗ 𝐾𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇) + 𝑉 ∗ 𝐾𝑒 =

𝝁+𝑍𝐶𝐿1 𝝈
𝑉

𝐸

∗ (1 − 𝑇) + 𝑉 ∗ 𝐾𝑒

Now, suppose company decides to increase its debt leverage, and thus, decrease its confidence
level, which in turn, mean bigger CL2 and, finally, bigger 𝑍𝐶𝐿2
𝐶𝐿%1 > 𝐶𝐿%2

𝐶𝐿2 > 𝐶𝐿1

𝑍𝐶𝐿2 > 𝑍𝐶𝐿1

Now, coupon payments increased from F1 to F2. Which means total amount of debt become
𝐷2 =

𝐹2 𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈
=
𝐾𝑑
𝐾𝑑

Note, that cost of debt 𝐾𝑑 would not increase, because all additional risk associated with
increased leverage would be covered by issued $ Equity Tokens, which will be discussed further.
Moreover, the total amount of VC capital (V) would not increase, it is:
𝑉1 = 𝑉2 = 𝑉
Thus, with new leverage, total amount of debt increased by:
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ΔD = 𝐷2 − 𝐷1 =

𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿1 𝝈
−
𝐾𝑑
𝐾𝑑

Moreover, amount of equity decreased by:

ΔE = E − (𝐷2 − 𝐷1 ) = 𝐸 −

𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿1 𝝈
−
𝐾𝑑
𝐾𝑑

Finally, VC WACC would change by:
ΔWACC = 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶2 − 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶1 =
𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈
𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿1 𝝈
𝐸−(
−
)
𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿1 𝝈
𝐸
𝐾𝑑
𝐾𝑑
𝐾𝑑
=
∗ 𝐾𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇) +
∗ 𝐾𝑒 − (
∗ (1 − 𝑇) + ∗ 𝐾𝑒 )
𝑉
𝑉
𝑉
𝑉
This equation represents the change of WACC in % terms. To make it in $ terms, it is necessary
to multiply it by amount of Invested Capital. Thus, the final formula of value created by the capital
restructuring would be:
𝝁+𝑍

(

𝐶𝐿2
𝐾𝑑

𝑉

𝝈

𝝁+𝑍

∗ 𝐾𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇) +

𝐸−(

𝐶𝐿2
𝐾𝑑

𝝈 𝝁+𝑍

𝑉

−

𝝈
𝐶𝐿1 )
𝐾𝑑

∗ 𝐾𝑒 − (

𝝁+𝑍𝐶𝐿1 𝝈
𝑉

𝐸

∗ (1 − 𝑇) + 𝑉 ∗ 𝐾𝑒 )) ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙

5.4 Calculations- negative side of $ Equity Tokens
Lastly, after it was determined the $ amount saved after capital restructuring, it is necessary to
calculate how much extra fund it would be necessary for the company to cover its extra leverage risk
with the help of $ Equity Tokens.
As it was stated above, $ Equity Tokens would cover only the decreased area of confidence level
(ΔCL%), which is limited by normal of F1 and F2. This is the case because:
1. if $ Equity Tokens would go beyond, and cover risks left side of F1 it means the decrease of Kd,
and as a result, the overall VC WACC of the company, which makes above calculations
inapplicable.
2. It is reasonable, because before company issued any Tokens securities, company used certain
confidence level beforehand, with tokens, there is no reasons to change its confidence level. All
things stayed the same with, or without tokens.
Since we look at the effect of tokens in long-run, it make sense to find expected value of EBIT (E(𝝁))
on the area, which would be distributed between normal of 𝑍𝐶𝐿1 and 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 . Expected value, in this case
would show the average number of EBIT, if it will fall into the area between 𝑍𝐶𝐿1 and 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 . As was stated
above, EBIT is normally distributed, which mean the graph of the distribution is:
𝑓 (𝑥) =

1
𝜎√2𝜋
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−(𝑥−𝜇) 2
∗ 𝑒 2𝜎 2

Expected value of 𝑍𝐶𝐿1 and 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 would be such point C on abscissa that make the masses on left
side and right side equal.

To find the location of point C, it is necessary make equal the masses from F 1 to C and from C to F2.
𝐶

∫

1

𝝁+𝑍𝐶𝐿1 𝝈 𝜎√2𝜋

∗𝑒

−(𝑥−𝜇)2
2𝜎 2

𝝁+𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈

=∫

𝐶

1
𝜎√2𝜋

∗𝑒

−(𝑥−𝜇) 2
2𝜎 2

For simplicity, let suppose some Ω is the root of this equation.
Number Ω means that on average if EBIT for several semiannual periods would fall into the
region between F1 and F2, in long-run EBIT would approach Ω.
However, as was stated above, a company’s new amount of coupon payment is F2 or 𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈.
This, means that company should cover the difference between Ω and 𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 by newly issued $
Equity Tokens. Thus,
𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 − Ω
is $ amount needed to finance. Moreover, when next semiannual EBIT would come, a company would
have to distribute extra $, in the amount of:

(𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 − Ω)(1 + 𝑥)1
Thus, final VC EBIT would be:
𝑉𝐶 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = 𝜇1 − (𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 − Ω)(1 + 𝑥)1
However, if
𝜇1 < (𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 − Ω)(1 + 𝑥)1
means, the difference between 𝜇1 and (𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 − Ω)(1 + 𝑥)1 would transfer for the next EBIT
distribution.
In the next period, a company would try to cover the previous difference by the new EBIT,
however, since it is the next period, the power of interest would increase.
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𝑉𝐶 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = 𝝁2 − (𝜇1 − (𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 − Ω))(1 + 𝑥)2
Again, if
𝝁2 < (𝜇1 − (𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 − Ω))(1 + 𝑥)2
the difference would transfer to the next period, with increased power of interest rate.
𝑉𝐶 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = 𝝁3 − (𝝁2 − (𝜇1 − (𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 − Ω)))(1 + 𝑥)3
This will continue until some EBIT would cover the debt and interest rate, that company owes to
its $ Equity Token Investors. (To see this property of $ Equity Token more closely, and property of $
Equity Token without increased power of interest rate, see Illustration 4.)
Thus, the general formula would be
𝑉𝐶 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = 𝝁𝑛 − (𝝁𝑛−1 … (−(𝜇1 − (𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 − Ω)))(1 + 𝑥)𝑛
This formula shows the $ amount that company would have to pay to its $ Equity Token Holders
in a long run. Now, when gains and expenses, associated with $ Equity Tokens are calculated, the puzzle
can be solved.

5.4 Calculations, the final effect of $ Equity Tokens
As was stated in section 5.2, the $ amount gained by new Debt-to-Equity ratio for the particular
EBIT is:
𝝁+𝑍

(

𝐶𝐿2
𝐾𝑑

𝑉

𝝈

𝝁+𝑍

∗ 𝐾𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇) +

𝐸−(

𝐶𝐿2
𝐾𝑑

𝝈 𝝁+𝑍

𝑉

−

𝝈
𝐶𝐿1 )
𝐾𝑑

∗ 𝐾𝑒 − (

𝝁+𝑍𝐶𝐿1 𝝈
𝑉

𝐸

∗ (1 − 𝑇) + 𝑉 ∗ 𝐾𝑒 )) ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙

On the other hand, from section 5.3, formula for VC EBIT is:
𝑉𝐶 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = 𝝁𝑛 − (𝝁𝑛−1 … (−(𝜇1 − (𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 − Ω)))(1 + 𝑥)𝑛
However, not VC EBIT is important, but the change of VC EBIT (ΔVC EBIT), the same as the
change in WACC (ΔWACC) which was in section 5.2. Thus, it is necessary to exclude 𝝁𝑛 from the
formula, to understand the change of capital structure, made by $ Equity Tokens, it is necessary to
compare positive change (Change in WACC) and negative change (Change in VC EBIT), and
−(𝝁𝑛−1 … (−(𝜇1 − (𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 − Ω)))(1 + 𝑥)𝑛
Is the exact amount of how some particular EBIT (𝝁𝑛 ) would change because of $ Equity Tokens.
To sum up, the final impact of $ Equity Token on financial structure of the company, and
therefore, the value that $ Equity Token could be calculated by the following formula:

𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 $ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠 =
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𝝁+𝑍

=(

𝐶𝐿2
𝐾𝑑

𝑉

𝝈

𝝁+𝑍

∗ 𝐾𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇) +

𝐸−(

𝐶𝐿2
𝐾𝑑

𝝈 𝝁+𝑍

−

𝝈
𝐶𝐿1 )
𝐾𝑑

𝑉

∗ 𝐾𝑒 − (

𝝁+𝑍𝐶𝐿1 𝝈
𝑉

𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 − (𝝁𝑛−1 … (−(𝜇1 − (𝝁 + 𝑍𝐶𝐿2 𝝈 − Ω)))(1 + 𝑥)𝑛

Illustration 1: A Smart-Contract Example
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𝐸

∗ (1 − 𝑇) + 𝑉 ∗ 𝐾𝑒 )) ∗

1
2
3
4
5

// Grade.java -- A Java program illustrating "if"
public class Grade

public static void main (String args[]) {
final int score = Integer.parseInt (args[0]);
final char grade; // "blank final"

6
7
8
9

if (score
grade
} else if
grade
} else if
grade
} else if
grade
} else {
grade
}

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

>= 90)
= 'A';
(score
= 'B';
(score
= 'C';
(score
= 'D';

{
>= 80) {
>= 70) {
>= 60) {

= 'F';

// N.B. All cases must be handled or analysis would yield
// an error: "Variable grade may not have been initialized."

22
23
24

System.out.printf ("The grade is %c.%n", grade);
}

25
26
27

{

}
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Illustration 2: A Storjcoin Price Formula
MxV=PxY.
M – Quantity of tokens
V – Velocity (transaction speed)
Y – Quantity of goods and services
P – Price for these goods
Since quantity of tokens is constant, P (price of goods and services) would depend on how many people
would be ready to provide a free storage space. This “provision” is Y (quantity of goods and services).
Moreover, the transaction speed (V) is simply a sequel of a demand side. If more people would be more
willing to buy free space, they would be ready to spend their tokens, which would increase velocity of
money inside Storj economy. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that P (price of these goods) of Storjcoin
is the aftermath of supply and demand for free space. Ceteris paribus, supply (demand) of free disk
space would decrease (increase) the price of a token.
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Illustration 3: An Optimal Token Issuance Strategy
A company issues tokens once per year and a current free-rate risk is 2.9%
Option 1: PV (price) of owning a blockchain platform:
$17,000

PV1 = ∑𝑥→∞ $102,500 + (1+2,9%)𝑥 = $688,706
Option 2: PV (price) of renting a blockchain platform:
$18,000

PV2 = ∑𝑥→∞ $93,500 + (1+2.9%) 𝑥 = $714,190
Option 1 is preferred to option 2 since $688,706<$714,190. It makes sense, since we consider the longrun case. One more issue is determining when option 2 overcomes option 1 to determine the best
strategy. For this, we have to take X periods instead of perpetuity and make options equal:
𝑥

𝑥

$17,000
$18,000
∑ $102,500 +
= ∑ $93,500 +
𝑥
(1 + 2,9%)
(1 + 2.9%) 𝑥
𝑥=1

𝑥=1
𝑥

∑

$1,000
= $9,000
(1 + 2,9%)𝑥

𝑥=1

𝑥 = 9.14 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠

If company would use tokens’ securities for less than 9.14 years, option 2 would be better off than
option 1 since PV of rent would not exceed the PV of cost of a new blockchain development. However, if
company would issue tokens in a long run (more than 9,14 years), the price for rent would overcome the
cost of a new blockchain development.
This was a case with current 10-year government bond interest rate, which is equal to 2.9%. Another
question is to solve this problem in a general form. Suppose, interest rate is equal to X%:
Option 1: PV (price) of owning a blockchain platform:
$17,000

PV1 = ∑𝑡→∞ $102,500 + (1+𝑋%) 𝑡 = $102,500 +

17,000
𝑋

Option 2: PV (price) of renting a blockchain platform:
$18,000

PV2 = ∑𝑡→∞ $93,500 + (1+𝑋%)𝑡 = $93,500 +

18,000
𝑋

It is unclear which option is better, since there is a lack of a numeric value. It is necessary to draw the
graph of the functions and perform a graphic research:
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17,000
𝑋
{
18,000
34
𝑦2 = $93,500 +
𝑋
𝑦1 = $102,500 +

1

It is clearly visible on the graph that intersection point is 𝑋 = 9 , such is:
1
𝑦1 > 𝑦2 | x ∈ (0: )
9

{

1
𝑦1 > 𝑦2 | x ∈ (0: )
9

1
𝑦2 < 𝑦1 | x ∈ (−∞: 0) ∪ ( : ∞)
9

One more issue is in determining when option 2 overcomes option 1 is to determine the best strategy.
For this, we have to take X periods instead of perpetuity and make cases equal:

𝑡

𝑡

∑ $102,500 +

$17,000
$18,000
= ∑ $93,500 +
(1 + 𝑋%)𝑡
(1 + 𝑋%)𝑡

𝑡=1

𝑡=1
𝑡

∑

$1,000
= $9,000
(1 + 𝑋%)𝑡

𝑡=1

Thus, the optimal strategy is to determine perspective issuance period t and supposed interest rate X.
Then, knowing those numbers put it in PV1 and PV2 and figure out which number is smaller. Lastly, come
up with the final decision.
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https://www.desmos.com/calculator/lw2vxryckq
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Illustration 4: PV of $ Equity Tokens After Anticipated Change in
Net Income
To show $ and % Equity Tokens Price Volatility it is necessary to create following table:
Name
Payment Period
Initial Token Price
Expected Net Income
# of Token Issued
Future Value of Token

$ Equity Token
Nx
C-gn35
Y
V
𝛿36

% Equity Token
Nx
K
Y
V

Discount Free Rate

(1+R)N

(1+R)N

𝑌
𝑉

Now, % Equity Token investors anticipated change in Expected Net Income such that:
𝑌 → 𝑦, 𝑌 > 𝑦
In such case, Future Value of % Equity Token would be:
𝑌 𝑦
→
𝑉 𝑉
And PV:
𝑦
𝑌
𝑉
𝑉
−𝐾 ⟶
−𝐾
(1 + 𝑅)1
(1 + 𝑅)1
The Nx would be always equal to 1 because all % Equity Tokens would be distributed no matter of the
Net Income cap.
In the case of $ Equity Tokens, the picture is going to be a bit different. Suppose the same happened and
$ Equity Token Holders anticipated that:
𝑌 → 𝑦, 𝑌 > 𝑦
Then, the distribution of such Net Income among all $ Equity Tokens would be:
δ𝑉; 𝑦 > 𝑉δ
{ 𝑦 ; 𝑦 < δ𝑋
δ𝑛37
35

C – gn; where C – price for the first $ Equity Token, gn – discount for subsequent $ Equity Token predetermined
by arithmetic sequence such as: gn+1 = ngn. This equation is applicable to theoretical situation when each
subsequent token has the same ΔRisk for delayed payment.
36
It is the main difference between $ and % Equity Tokens. FV of $ Equity Tokens do not depend upon Expected
Net Income, they aimed to set FV of 𝛿, whereas FV of % Equity Tokens depend upon the final amount of Net
Income gained by the company
37
n – the last line number of $ Equity Token which was sufficient to cover from y
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Under these two different scenarios, the PV for each Holder of $ Equity Tokens would be:
𝑋1
𝑋2
𝑋3
𝑋𝑉
− 𝑐,
− 𝑐 + 𝑔,
− 𝑐 + 2𝑔, … ,
− 𝑐 + (𝑉 − 1)𝑔; 𝑦 > 𝑉δ
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
𝑋1
𝑋2
𝑋3
𝑋𝑁
− 𝐶,
− 𝑐 + 𝑔,
− 𝑐 + 2𝑔, … ,
− 𝑐 + (𝑁 − 1)𝑔, … ; 𝑦 < 𝑉δ
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
{(1 + 𝑅)
The first scenario illustrates the PV of each $ Equity Token Holder if Net Income (y) would be enough to
repurchase all $ Equity Tokens or Y>V𝛿. It could be inferred under the scenario where y>V𝛿 the largest
PV would have the buyer of the last $ Equity Token since its Token had the biggest discount of Vg.
On the other hand, under the scenario where Net Income was not enough to repurchase all $ Equity
Tokens, or, in other words y<V𝛿 company repurchased only N number of tokens. In this case the owner
of the biggest PV is the owner of Nth tokens, since it has discount price of Ng. However, the question is
what would happen with the owners of:
𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠 ∈ [𝑁 + 1: 𝑉]
For them, the process would start over again because now, there $ Equity Tokens would have a claim for
a subsequent Net Income distribution of the firm. So, for those $ Equity Token holders who was not
covered first time, the distribution of Net Income would happen in following way
(𝑉 − 𝑁)δ; 𝑦2 > (𝑉 − 𝑁)δ
𝑦
{ 2
; 𝑦2 < (𝑉 − 𝑁)δ; 𝑍 ∈ (0: 𝑉 − 𝑁)
𝑍
Now, the PV distribution for each $ Equity Token holder would be described by three scenarios:
𝑋1
𝑋2
𝑋3
𝑋𝑉
− 𝑐,
− 𝑐 + 𝑔,
− 𝑐 + 2𝑔, … ,
− 𝑐 + 𝑉𝑔; 𝑦 > 𝑉δ
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
𝑋1
𝑋2
𝑋3
𝑋𝑁
𝑋𝑁+1
− 𝐶,
− 𝑐 + 𝑔,
− 𝑐 + 2𝑔, … ,
− 𝑐 + (𝑁 − 1)𝑔,
− 𝑐 + 𝑁𝑔, …
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)2
𝑋𝑁+2
𝑋𝑉
,
− 𝑐 + (𝑁 + 1)𝑔, … +
− 𝑐 + (𝑉 − 1)𝑔 ; 𝑦1 < 𝑉δ; 𝑦2 > (𝑉 − 𝑁)δ
(1 + 𝑅)2
(1 + 𝑅)2
𝑋1
𝑋2
𝑋3
𝑋𝑁
𝑋𝑁+1
− 𝐶,
− 𝑐 + 𝑔,
− 𝑐 + 2𝑔, … ,
− 𝑐 + (𝑁 − 1)𝑔,
− 𝑐 + 𝑁𝑔, …
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)2
𝑋𝑁+2
𝑋𝑁+𝑍
,
− 𝑐 + (𝑁 + 1)𝑔, … +
− 𝑐 + (𝑁 + 𝑍 − 1)𝑔, … , ; 𝑦1 < 𝑉δ; 𝑦2 < (𝑉 − 𝑁)δ
2
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)2
{

So, this system of equations shows three cases of PV distribution among $ Equity Tokens if y1 > V𝛿, y1 <
V𝛿 but y2 > (V-N)*𝛿, and last one is y1 < V𝛿 and y2 < (V-N)*𝛿. For $ Equity Tokens Holders who have
𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠 ∈ [𝑁 + 𝑍 + 1: 𝑉]
the process will start over again with the next Net Income = y3.
To generalize the distribution of PV among $ Equity Holders with yᾠ distributions with α, β, γ… ᾠ parts
of V, the formula would be:
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𝑋1
𝑋2
𝑋3
𝑋α
𝑋α+1
− 𝐶,
− 𝑐 + 𝑔,
− 𝑐 + 2𝑔, … ,
− 𝑐 + (α − 1)𝑔,
− 𝑐 + α𝑔, …
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)
(1 + 𝑅)𝑎
𝑋β
𝑋β+1
𝑋α+2
𝑋V
(
)
(
)
(
)
,
−
𝑐
+
α
+
1
𝑔,
…
+
−
𝑐
+
β
−
1
𝑔,
−
𝑐
+
β
−
1
𝑔,
…
,
− 𝑐 + (V − 1)𝑔
(1 + 𝑅)𝑎
(1 + 𝑅)𝑎
(1 + 𝑅)β
(1 + 𝑅)V
; 𝑦𝑎 < 𝑉𝑋; 𝑦 β < (𝑉 − α)𝑋; 𝑦γ < (𝑉 − α − β)𝑋; … ; 𝑦ᾠ > (𝑉 − α − β … − ᾠ)X
Unlike the distribution with only one round, the distribution with more than two round does not give
straight answer who is the owner of largest PV and what is the optimal strategy to have this PV since
there is no straight correlation between free-rate risk R and discounted token price of C-gn. It is possible
to draw the XY-plane graph of the correlation between R and (C-gn) and as a result develop an optimal
strategy for the anticipated number of rounds, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Illustration 5: Conflict of Interests Between a Company, and
Utility Token Investors.
To begin, it is necessary to determine the goals of each party, in our case is Company, and Utility Token
Investor (Further – Investor).
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 → 𝑀𝐴𝑋
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟: $𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑 − $𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎ℎ𝑠𝑒 → 𝑀𝑎𝑥
It is implied that company has infinite scale of production. On the other hand, demand for the product
issued by the company continuously goes down with the amount of produced by the company. To sum
up, there is graph presented.

On the graph illustrated the average price to Xth product. Since company has unlimited economies of
scale, the more it produces the more average price to produce consequent product decreasing. The
decreasing of average price production goes by the function ф(х). The more company produce the speed
of decreasing is slowing down. Mathematically speaking, graph has negative slope, negative 1 st
derivative, but positive 2nd derivative.
ф(х):

𝑡𝑎𝑛𝛼

𝑑𝑟
+𝑟
𝑑𝛼
< 0; ф′ (х) < 0; ф′′ (𝑥) > 0

𝑑𝑟
− 𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝛼
𝑑𝛼

Function f(x) represent the average price for Xth product. The more product there is on the market, the
less price consumers ready to pay for it since it become less elite and more available.
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Derivative of f(x) is less than derivative of ф(х) which means that the speed of average cost reduction of
the product because of economies of scale is smaller than the speed of decreased demand of consumer
of the product.
Now, it is necessary to consider, what would happen with this graphs if company would sell Z tokens for
the price of δ. It is clear, that ф(х) would stay the same, since the economies of scale would not
change.38 On the other hand, f(x) would change. The first Z products would have constant price of δ, and
all other consequent products would have a demand of f(x).3940
ф(х) = ф(х)
{
δ; x ≤ Z
𝑓(𝑥)41 = { ( )
𝑓 𝑥 ;𝑥 > 𝑍

Now, it is necessary to decide what strategy company should choose in both cases, to maximize its
profit. To figure it out, it is top priority to show how is profit represented in both of this graphs. Let’s
begin with the first graph. Every point on ф(х) represent the total amount spend on the production of X
products. The total $ amount spend is X*Y, or the total product produced (X) multiply by the average
price per product (Y).
$ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑 = 𝑋1 𝑌1 = 𝑋1 ∗ ф(𝑋1 )

38

Assume, there is no costs associated with token issuance
Assume 1 token represent ownership of 1 product
40
Assume the overall demand for the product is not effected by token’s presale
41
It is important to point out that now f(x) is not represent the average consumer price for the overall product.
Now it represent the average price of the product of x∈(0: δ] and x∈ (δ: ∞) separately. It is going to be important
further on.
39
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On the other hand, every point on the f(x) is represent the number of product sold (X), and the average
price of sold product. Thus, X*Y is the total revenue gained from the sale of the products.
$ 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 = 𝑋2 𝑌2 = 𝑋2 ∗ 𝑓(𝑋2 )
From this, the profit formula would be:
$ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = $ 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 − $ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑 = 𝑋2 𝑌2 − 𝑋1 𝑌1 = 𝑋2 ∗ 𝑓(𝑋2 ) − 𝑋1 ∗ ф(𝑋1 )
Moreover, since company makes X product it would sell the same X amount of product. The only one
case when company would gain extra profit by making X amount of product but sell less than X amount
of product would be with extremely high economies of scale index and extremely inelastic type of
product. But I would not consider this case because this type of things happens extremely rarely on the
practice. Thus, following would apply:
$ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = $ 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 − $ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑 = 𝑋1 𝑌2 − 𝑋1 𝑌1 = 𝑋1 (𝑌2 − 𝑌1 ) = 𝑋1 (𝑓(𝑋1 ) − ф(𝑋1 ))

Now, the question is what is going to be such X when the
𝑋(𝑓(𝑥) − ф(𝑥)) → 𝑀𝐴𝑋
To find that, we should take the first derivative of the profit function (q1).
𝑞1 (𝑥)

𝑑
𝑑
𝑑
= (𝑋(𝑓(𝑥) − ф(𝑥)))
= (𝑥𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑥ф(𝑥))
= 𝑓 (𝑥) + 𝑥𝑓 ′ (𝑥) − ф(𝑥) − 𝑥ф(𝑥) = 𝑋𝑎
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑥

Thus, the maximum profit would be achievable if X is going to be such:
𝑓 (𝑥) + 𝑥𝑓 ′ (𝑥) − ф(𝑥) − 𝑥ф(𝑥) = 0
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Let’s say the root of this equation would be 𝑋𝑎 Under this conditions company and consumers have
following results:
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 ′ 𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡: 𝑋𝑎 ∗ 𝑓 (𝑋𝑎 ) − 𝑋𝑎 ∗ ф(𝑋𝑎 )
𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ) = 𝑓(𝑋𝑎 )
According to this calculation, the optimal strategy for the company is issue 𝑋𝑎 products, if it does not
issue any Utility Tokens. Now, it is time to consider the optimal strategy for the company when it issues
Utility Tokens.
As it was before, the question is to find such X, where the
Profit = Earned – Spend = MAX
As it was in the case without Utility Tokens,
𝑋 ∗ ф(𝑥) = 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑
However, the picture with the Earned factor would be change in comparison to first case. It would
happen because if company would issue Z tokens with the price of δ it would be guaranteed for the
company to earned at least of Z ∗ δ no matter what. Then, all products that
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠 ∈ [𝑍 + 1: ∞)
Would have a market price with the accordance of graph f(x). Which mean
𝑍 ∗ δ + f(x) ∗ (x − z) = 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑42
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 − 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑 = 𝑍 ∗ δ + f(x) ∗ (x − z) − 𝑋 ∗ ф(𝑥)
To find such X that profit would be maximum, it is necessary to calculate first derivative of profit
function (q2)
𝑞2 (𝑥)

𝑑
𝑑
= (𝑍 ∗ δ + f(x) ∗ (x − z) − 𝑋 ∗ ф(𝑥))
= 0 + 𝑓 ′ (𝑥) ∗ (𝑥 − 𝑧) + 𝑓 (𝑥) − ф(𝑥) − 𝑥 ∗ ф′ (𝑥)
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑥
= 𝑓 ′ (𝑥) ∗ 𝑥 − 𝑓 ′ (𝑥) ∗ 𝑧 + 𝑓 (𝑥) − ф(𝑥) − 𝑥 ∗ ф′ (𝑥)
= 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑥𝑓 ′ (𝑥) − ф(𝑥) − 𝑥ф(𝑥) − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥) = 𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥)

It is clearly visible that with Utility Token the maximized profit number of products issued would be not
Xa, but 𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥). The question is, what 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥) means. Z is always positive number, since it represent
the number of tokens issued, and 𝑓 ′ (𝑥) is always negative number, as I said above. Thus, 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥) would
be always negative number, and −𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥) would be always positive. This in turn mean
𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥) > 𝑋𝑎
This means that no matter of numbers of Utility Token issued (Z) and the price per token (δ) company
would be always interested to produce more amount of products, it would interested to issue −𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥)
more products every time. Thus, in the case of issued Utility Tokens:
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 ′ 𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡: (𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥)) ∗ 𝑓(𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥)) − (𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥)) ∗ ф((𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥))

42

Suppose company would issue more products than it sells Utility Tokens, which was backed up by those Tokens.
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𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥))
From this, it is clear that it is impossible to compare Company’s profit with and without tokens, since it
does not show real numbers but only theoretical functions of f(x) and ф(x). However, it is clear that
𝑓(𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥)) < 𝑓(𝑋𝑎 )
Because
𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥) > 𝑋𝑎
and
𝑓 ′ (𝑥) < 0
To sum up, if company would issue Utility Token it would be interested to increase its production from
𝑋𝑎 to 𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥), which would decrease the value of issued tokens from 𝑓 (𝑋𝑎 ) to 𝑓(𝑋𝑎 − 𝑧𝑓 ′ (𝑥)).
Thus, Utility Tokens would always inculcate the conflict of interests. quod erat demonstrandum.
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Table 3: Bitcoin blockchain average transaction fee
Historic Daily Average Bitcoin Transaction fees
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